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AGAINST SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GRAND 
THEORY: A PLEA FOR PRAGMATISM IN RESOLVING 
DISPUTES INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
Robert F. Blomquist* 
INTRODUCTION 
 At the outset of the twenty-first century, the frenetic pace of global 
growth in international trade and the concomitant tempo of new legal 
undertakings to protect the environment have spurred a variety of novel 
conflicts.  In attempts to resolve these conflicts, some free trade enthusiasts 
urge that environmental concerns be trumped by the imperative of 
expanding international trade.  In turn, some environmentalists contend that 
protecting biodiversity, ensuring clean air and water, minimizing hazardous 
wastes, and similar concerns are more important than liberalized trade and 
should, therefore, be accorded priority status. 
 On occasion, zealous environmentalists, as well as aggressive free 
traders, try to justify their respective paradigms by an appeal to various 
strains of all-encompassing sustainable development grand theory—
characterized by abstract statements of the “good” and totalizing, top-down 
visions of the “way” to solve conflicts between trade and the environment.  
While such grand theorizing can be fun or exhilarating, it is not useful in 
the messy real world that we inhabit where trade versus the environment 
disputes are fact-intensive, characterized by shades of grey (instead of black 
and white), and subject to different legal, political, economic, and social 
considerations. 
 In this essay, I intend to sketch the downside of grand theoretical 
projects, in general, and then to go on to discuss some examples of grand 
(and misguided) theories of sustainable development.  I then seek to 
articulate what I call a more useful “mood” of global trade/eco-pragmatism 
and some tentative thoughts on expressing this mood in future disputes 
involving trade and the environment.  My purpose is to offer a first take on 
the importance of shifting the emphasis in international trade and 
environmental conflicts away from the grandly theoretical and toward the 
less glamorous—but more fruitful—pragmatic. 
                                                                                               
 * Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; J.D. 1977, Cornell Law School; 
B.S. 1973, University of Pennsylvania (Wharton School).  My thanks go to colleagues who offered 
helpful comments on a previous draft that I presented to an Oxford Round Table Conference on Trade, 
Growth, and the Environment at Oxford University August, 2004. 
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 I shall proceed as follows.  In Part I, I discuss the dangerous allure of 
grand theory, on the one hand, and the call by philosophers and legal 
thinkers, on the other hand, for a more informal reasonableness and 
practical wisdom in approaching our worldly problems.  In Part II, I turn to 
an illustrative examination of three examples of what I describe as grand 
theories of sustainable development that, while interesting, are not very 
useful or practical.  In Part III, I offer some rough-hewn musings on global 
trade/eco-pragmatism as an alternative to sustainable development grand 
theory in unpacking and resolving conflicts between trade and the 
environment. 
I.  THE DANGEROUS ALLURE OF GRAND THEORY 
 Academicians and world order pundits love theory and love grand 
theory even more.  Indeed, theorophiles gain mental stimulation and ego-
satisfaction from propounding “scheme[s] or system[s] of ideas or 
statements held [to be] an explanation or account of a group of facts or 
phenomena.”1  Theory-lovers relish the spinning of “statement[s] of what 
are held to be the general laws, principles, or causes of something known or 
observed.”2  Furthermore, theorophiles tend to be unduly impressed by the 
apparent certainty and sweep of mathematical and mechanical reasoning 
and irrationally exuberant with sets of theorems forming abstract connected 
systems.3  Examples of such mathematical-mechanical theories are equation 
 
 1. XII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 902 (2d ed. 1989) (defining the word “theory”). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Interestingly, one can discern a style of certitude and ambition analogous to mathematical 
and mechanical reasoning in the realm of literary theory as practiced in academic English departments 
over the last several years.  As explained in a recent review of the book After Theory: 
Anyone who served on the academic front of the culture wars in the closing 
decades of the twentieth century is likely to prick up his ears and experience a 
kind of mental salivation at this conjunction of author and title.  “Theory” (with a 
capital T, and/or scare quotes) is the loose and capacious term generally used to 
refer to the academic discourses which arose out of the impact of structuralism, 
and more particularly post-structuralism, on the humanities (or “human sciences” 
as academics in continental Europe, where it all started, prefer to call them).  Key 
figures in its evolution were Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, 
Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault, who subjected the methodologies of the 
founding fathers of structuralism, such as Saussure and Lévi-Strauss, and the 
work of other seminal modern thinkers like Marx and Freud, to a scrutiny that 
was at once critical and creative.  One might say that Theory began when theory 
itself began to be theorized—or, in the buzz word of the day, “deconstructed.” 
 In due course the movement’s center of gravity moved from France to America 
where it was developed and promulgated . . . .  On both continents it assimilated 
and theorized the nascent movement of feminist criticism.  It extended the scope 
of traditional literary criticism to take in the whole range of cultural production, 
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theory, function theory, number theory, probability theory, theoretical 
physics, and Kant’s a priori concepts and criterion of empirical truth. 
 As argued by philosopher Stephen Toulmin in his brilliant 2001 book, 
Return to Reason, practical reason, or rationality, has come under attack in 
recent years because of the undue influence of classical mechanics and 
abstract mathematical methods on our idea of what intelligent problem-
solving should be.4  As Toulmin points out, deduction in the style of 
Euclidean geometry, mechanically predictable and rigorous laws in the style 
of Newton and Galileo, and indubitable certainty in the style of Descartes’ 
“I think, therefore I am” mentality, all exert a troublesome cultural 
influence insofar as they overshadow a looser, more pragmatic, and less 
abstract concept of reasonableness.5  What we need in the twenty-first 
century, according to Toulmin, is less abstract (mathematically-inspired) 
theorizing and grand-theorizing, and more open-minded, informal 
reasonableness in a return to Aristotlean practical wisdom (a combination 
of practical reason and productive reason).6 
 
and it spawned a number of new, nonaesthetic approaches to this material under a 
bewildering variety of names—the New Historicism, postcolonial studies, 
subaltern studies, queer theory, and so on, each with its own jargon, periodicals, 
and conferences.  Most of these projects were seen, and saw themselves, as 
belonging to that even looser and larger phenomenon known as “postmodernism.” 
 One very controversial effect of Theory on the academic study of literature was 
to undermine the authority of the traditional canon and to install in its place a set 
of alternative subcanons such as women’s writing, gay and lesbian writing, 
postcolonial writing, and the founding texts of Theory itself.  It found its warmest 
welcome among smart young recruits to the academic profession, eager to try out 
this bright new methodological gadgetry with which they could dazzle and 
disconcert their elders. 
David Lodge, Goodbye to All That, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 27, 2004, at 39, 39 (reviewing Terry 
Eagleton, AFTER THEORY (2004)). 
 4. See STEPHEN TOULMIN, RETURN TO REASON 1–13 (2001) (discussing how science and 
mathematics have impacted rational thought). 
 5. See id. at 48–50 (providing an example of the application of pragmatism with an anecdote 
about a theologist identifying a weakness in Newtonian theory by looking outside of mathematical 
models and scientific theory). 
 6. See id. at 108–14 (arguing that practical and clinical knowledge should be used to inform 
theory). 
Theoretical reason is traditionally distinguished from practical reason, a faculty 
exercised in determining guides to good conduct and in deliberating about proper 
courses of action.  Aristotle contrasts it, as well, with productive reason, which is 
concerned with “making”: shipbuilding, sculpting, healing, and the like. 
 Kant distinguishes theoretical reason not only from practical reason but also 
(sometimes) from the faculty of understanding, in which the categories originate.  
Theoretical reason, possessed of its own a priori concepts (“ideas of reason”), 
regulates the activities of the understanding.  It presupposes a systematic unity in 
nature, sets the goal for scientific inquiry, and determines the “criterion of 
empirical truth” (Critique of Pure Reason).  Theoretical reason, on Kant’s 
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 In the realm of legal theory, prominent commentators have, generally 
and particularly, pointed out the dangers of totalizing/foundational theory.  
In general, Judge Richard A. Posner (a U.S. Circuit Court Judge since 1981 
and a prolific judicial opinion writer and academic legal writer) has 
persuasively argued against what he refers to as legal mystification qua 
grand theory.7  According to Posner, the law should be freed from moral 
theory, “a great mystifier.”8  In Posner’s view, the grand theoretical 
approach to trying to solve important problems through law is misguided 
and an evasion of the real need of law, which is to achieve a more nuanced 
and complete grasp of the social, political, and economic facts from which 
legal conflicts grow.9 
 In particular, legal scholars like Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry 
have criticized two specific areas of legal/cultural grand theory—radical 
multicultural theories and American constitutional theories.10  For example, 
in pointing out the “perils of foundationalism”11 in constitutional grand 
theory, they observed: 
 
[I]n their search for foundations, [American constitutional grand 
theorists have] proposed ever more novel and less plausible 
solutions.  In consequence, some of the most prominent 
[American] constitutional theorists of our day [have] reached 
simple, elegant, and utterly wrong conclusions almost at every 
turn. 
  . . . In trying to make constitutional interpretation simple, 
certain, and coherent, [these grand theorists] mischaracterize both 
the Constitution and the judicial enterprise.  Both are human 
creations, and thus both are complex, uncertain, and sometimes 
 
conception, seeks an explanatory “completeness” and an “unconditionedness” of 
being that transcend what is possible in experience. 
THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 796 (Robert Audi ed., 1995). 
 7. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, at vii (1999). 
 8. Id.  Posner has pursued the theme of demystifying law in a number of other books, 
including RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990) and RICHARD A. POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW (1995).  See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 2–3 
(2003), for a fact-based, pragmatic approach to solving legal problems. 
 9. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 7, at viii. 
 10. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL 
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 5 (1997) (defining radical multiculturalism as containing a 
patchwork of ideological adherents who are united by their rejection of universalism and objectivity, 
instead believing “western ideas and institutions are socially constructed to serve the interests of the 
powerful, especially straight, white men”); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY 
SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, at ix (2002) 
(criticizing the tendency of modern constitutional scholars to use foundational theories to provide simple 
answers and attempting to unify all constitutional doctrines). 
 11. FARBER & SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY, supra note 10, at ix. 
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inconsistent.  Judicial interpretation of the Constitution is a 
constantly evolving process of accommodation, and it cannot be 
constrained by artificial [abstract centralizing] theories . . . .12 
 
 For the reasons explained in the balance of this text, “grand sustainable 
development theory” is—like other grand theoretical approaches to a 
complex world—dangerously alluring but ultimately misguided. 
II.  THREE EXAMPLES OF GRAND (AND MISGUIDED) THEORIES OF 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 Three prominent examples of what may be viewed as grand sustainable 
development theory are discussed below: (a) global codification of general 
principles of international environmental law into a proposed international 
environmental law covenant; (b) suggestions to centralize international 
institutions governing the environment and sustainable development; and 
(c) a call for strict adjudicatory interpretation of norms governing 
international trade and environmental conflicts.  While these ideas for 
fostering grand sustainable development theory are interesting, stimulating, 
and thought-provoking, they are wrong-headed in their attempts to make the 
jumbled world of international trade and the environment simple, elegant, 
and predictable. 
 
 
 
 12. Id.; cf. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) 
(demonstrating the ineffectuality of constitutional law decisions made without empirical support and 
based instead on constitutional theory).  While Posner appears to condemn constitutional theory in toto, 
Farber and Sherry do not reject all constitutional theory—just grand, foundational constitutional theory.  
FARBER & SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY, supra note 10, at ix.  Moreover, they are 
willing to extract kernels of edification from grand constitutional theoretical approaches.  See id. at x  
(noting that the radical constitutional theorists are only flawed “in part” by their rejection of 
pragmatism).  In the realm of international politics, there is a plethora of grand theories.  See, e.g., GARY 
HART, THE FOURTH POWER: A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY, at vii (2004) (juxtaposing the imperial political strategy of the United States with a principled 
grand strategy applying “our economic, political, and military powers to the large purposes of providing 
security, enlarging opportunity, and expanding liberal democracy”); ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, THE GRAND 
CHESSBOARD: AMERICAN PRIMACY AND ITS GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES, at xiii–xiv (1997) 
(highlighting the importance of geopolitical strategy in maintaining global supremacy).  See ANNE-
MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004), for a more fact-specific, pragmatic analysis of 
international policies. 
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A.  Global Codification of General Principles and Concepts of 
International Environmental Law into an Overarching International 
Environmental Law Covenant 
 A variety of proposals have been advanced over the past decade and a 
half to elaborate and clarify basic principles of sustainable development, 
including the codification of a set of binding international environmental 
principles.13 
 Perhaps the most prominent paragon of these global sustainable 
development codification proposals is the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature’s Commission on Environmental Law, 
International Covenant on Environment and Development proposal (IUCN 
Draft Covenant), promulgated in March 1995.14  In the ringing, idealistic, 
and totalizing language of grand sustainable development theory, the IUCN 
Draft Covenant espouses the following policy rationales15 for a binding 
international environmental and sustainable development covenant: 
 
(1) [T]o provide the legal framework to support the further 
integration of the various aspects of environment and 
development; 
 
(2) [T]o create an agreed single set of fundamental principles 
like a “code of conduct”, as used in many civil law, socialist, and 
theocratic traditions, which may guide States, intergovernmental 
organizations, and individuals; 
 
 13. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 375 (2d ed. 
2002) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY] (citing EXPERTS GROUP ON 
ENVTL. LAW OF THE WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1989); D. Hunter et al., 
Concepts and Principles of International Environmental Law: An Introduction (UNEP Environment and 
Trade Monograph No. 2 1994); Philippe Sands, International Law in the Field of Sustainable 
Development: Emerging Legal Principles, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
53, 66 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995); UNEP, Position Paper on International Environmental Law Aiming at 
Sustainable Development, Annex I to the Final Report of the Expert Group Workshop on International 
Environmental Law Aiming at Sustainable Development, UNEP/IEL/WS/3/2 (Oct. 4, 1996)). 
 14. Wolfgang E. Burhenne & Parvez Hassan, Forword to the First Edition of COMM’N ON 
ENVTL. LAW, INT’L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT 
ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, at xv (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter IUCN DRAFT COVENANT], 
available at http://www.i-c-e-l.org/english//EPLP31EN_rev2.pdf. 
 15. I use the term “policy” to mean the simple “statement of [an] objective.”  HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF 
LAW 141 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) [hereinafter LEGAL PROCESS].  This 
is to be jurisprudentially distinguished from a “principle” which “also describes a result to be achieved” 
differing “in that . . . the result ought to be achieved and includes, either expressly or by reference to 
well-understood bodies of thought, a statement of the reasons why it should be achieved.”  Id. at 142. 
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(3) [T]o consolidate into a single juridical framework the vast 
body of widely accepted, but disparate principles, of “soft law” 
on environment and development (many of which are now 
declaratory of customary international law); 
 
(4) [T]o facilitate institutional and other linkages to be made 
between existing treaties and their implementation; 
 
(5) [T]o reinforce the consensus on basic legal norms, both 
internationally, where not all States are party to all environmental 
treaties, even though the principles embodied in them are 
universally subscribed to, and nationally, where administrative 
jurisdiction is often fragmented among diverse agencies and the 
legislation still has gaps; 
 
(6) [T]o fill in gaps in international law, by placing in a global 
context principles which only appear in certain places and by 
adding matters which are of fundamental importance but which 
are not in any universal treaty; 
 
(7) [T]o help level the playing field for international trade by 
minimizing the likelihood of non-tariff barriers based on vastly 
differing environmental and developmental policies; 
 
(8) [T]o save on scarce resources and diplomatic time by 
consolidating in one single instrument norms, which thereafter 
can be incorporated by reference into future agreements, thereby 
eliminating unnecessary reformulation and repetition, unless such 
reformulation is considered necessary; and 
 
(9) [T]o lay out a common basis upon which future lawmaking 
efforts might be developed16 
 
 Despite the grandeur of the IUCN Draft Covenant’s environmental and 
development goals for humankind,17 the entire project is an exercise in 
grand sustainable theory that—even if it conceivably could be 
accomplished—would involve great expenditures of time and effort, would 
be divisive, would result in a watered-down covenant (to meet the 
innumerable concerns of a wide assortment of negotiating parties 
 
 16. IUCN DRAFT COVENANT, supra note 14, at xvi (numbering added). 
 17. Cf. ERVIN LASZLO ET AL., GOALS FOR MANKIND, at vii–xv (1977) (describing the great 
panoply of human social goals). 
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throughout the planet), and because of the project’s excessively abstract 
nature, it would not be useful in specific contexts.18 
B.  Centralization of International Institutions Governing the Environment 
and Sustainable Development 
 Many theorists have called for reform of the United Nations (UN) 
institutional structure to handle better the challenges of sustainable 
development we now face around the world.  Most of these proposals 
suggest the need for one central global environmental organization.19 
 The most prominent recent proposals for centralizing international 
institutions governing the environment and sustainable development have 
been the following two documents: (1) the United Nations Environment 
Programme’s (UNEP) Governing Council Resolution of 1997; and (2) a 
1998 report to the UN Secretary General from the United Nations Task 
 
 18. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 13, at 375. 
 19. See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE 
FUTURE 78 (1994).  Individual international governmental organizations (IGOs) “have been given 
narrow mandates, small budgets, and limited support.  No one organization has the authority or political 
strength to serve as a central clearinghouse or coordinator” over environmental and development 
concerns.  Id.; Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 259, 264 (1992). 
 If an institutional [centralized] home for the conduct of the negotiations 
themselves could be devised, it would cut the substantial costs of dealing with the 
global issues.  Instead of having a new group of nations assemble to discuss each 
problem by holding a series of international meetings at different locations around 
the world in an effort to hammer out a consensus on the provisions of a 
multilateral convention, there could easily be a uniform method for bringing the 
nations together, conveying the relevant scientific information to them and 
conducting the negotiations.  Such procedures offer the possibility of appreciably 
reducing the cost of all the present diplomatic activity, as well as increasing the 
coherence of the rules. 
Id.; see also Frank Biermann, The Case for a World Environment Organization, ENV’T., Nov. 2000, at 
22, 26 (noting the argument that a centralized environmental body could improve compliance through 
enhanced monitoring and establishing “a common comprehensive reporting system on the state of the 
environment and on the state of implementation in different countries as well as by stronger efforts in 
raising public awareness”); W. Bowman Cutter et al., New World, New Deal, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 
2000, at 80, 94–95. 
 No vehicle exists for nations to negotiate new multilateral pacts on 
environmental issues.  That is one big reason why environmentalists have focused 
on the WTO [World Trade Organization].  But using the WTO as the forum for 
multilateral environmental negotiations both endangers further trade liberalization 
and raises the risk that trade will be restricted in the name of environmentalism 
but in the service of protectionism.  To head off these risks [the international 
community] should . . . creat[e] a new Global Environmental Organization to 
develop and enforce new international agreements on specific problems, using the 
successful Montreal protocol on slowing ozone depletion as a model. 
Id. 
2005]             Against Sustainable Development Grand Theory                741 
 
                                                                                              
Force on Environment and Human Settlements.  Regarding the former—the 
1997 UNEP Governing Council Resolution—the proposal boldly asserts 
that: 
 
[The UNEP] has been and should continue to be the principal 
United Nations body in the field of the environment . . . . 
 . . . the role of the United Nations Environment Programme 
is to be the leading global environmental authority that sets the 
global environmental agenda, that promotes the coherent 
implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development within the United Nations system and that serves as 
an authoritative advocate for the global environment[.]20 
 
 Turning to the latter document—the 1998 report from the United 
Nations Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements, headed by 
Klaus Toepfer (Toepfer Task Force Report)—identifies a proliferation of 
environmental institutions that have changed the UN’s environmental 
structure.21  This proliferation of institutions has given rise to “substantial 
overlaps, unrecognized linkages and gaps.”22  According to the Toepfer 
Task Force Report: 
 
These flaws are basic and pervasive.  They prevent the United 
Nations system from using its scarce resources to best advantage 
in addressing problems that are crucial to the human future; harm 
the credibility and weight of the United Nations in the 
environmental arena; and damage the United Nations working 
relationship with its partners in and outside of Government.23 
 
 As one commentator has opined in explaining the Toepfer Task Force 
Report: 
 
 A variety of reasons can be found for this multiplicity of 
institutions, including the growth in ad hoc, piecemeal, and 
sectoral environmental law-making, which [has been] represented 
 
 20. Nairobi Declaration on the Role and Mandate of the United Nations Environment 
Programme, Governing Council, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 25, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/52/25 
(1997). 
 21. Report of the United Nations Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements, U.N. 
GAOR, 53d Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 30, at ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/53/463 (1998) [hereinafter Toepfer 
Task Force Report].  This report was included in the Secretary General’s report to the General Assembly 
in 1998.  See Report of the Secretary-General on Environment and Human Settlements, U.N. GAOR, 
53d Sess., Agenda Item 30, U.N. Doc. A/53/463 (1998), for the full text of the report. 
 22. Toepfer Task Force Report, supra note 21, at ¶ 20. 
 23. Id. 
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by the MEAs [multilateral environmental agreements]; periodic 
efforts at “global conferencing” on environment and sustainable 
development, which was represented by the Rio and 
Johannesburg summits; as well as the creation of more permanent 
structures with mandates that overlap with UNEP’s existing or 
potential mandate, such as the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) and the Commission on Sustainable Development 
(CSD).24 
 
 Despite the surface attractiveness of grand sustainable development 
theories for centralizing international environmental governance into one 
global super-agency, for three reasons, it is naïve to expect that these 
centralizing/totalizing/top-down institutional schemes would lead to better 
coordination and coherence of international environmental standards, in 
general, or would result in better, more satisfactory resolution of trade 
versus environmental disputes.  First, global environmental governance and 
sustainable development are problems that are primarily political and 
economic rather than structural.  It seems highly doubtful that a global 
super-agency would be any more successful than the ad hoc progress that 
has been achieved (or any more adept at resolving future problems).  
Geopolitical “dog fights” are a realistic feature of international 
environmental and sustainable development disputes and will not go away 
by reconfiguring lines and boxes on an organization chart.25  Second, there 
is an inherent conflict between calls for a more powerful, centralized global 
environmental organization and increased citizen and nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) participation.  Effective international sustainable 
development participation is probably more likely to occur in ad hoc 
settings and more workable on an issue-by-issue basis.26  Third, it seems 
likely that the creation of centralized global governing bodies with greater 
powers to craft international environmental law would hinder sustainable 
development, rather than promote it.  Sustainable development, as Michael 
Jacobs has pointed out, is primarily important as a “contestable concept,”27 
and “[u]ltimately, agreement over the precise definition of the term [is] less 
 
 24. Bharat H. Desai, Mapping the Future of International Environmental Governance, in 13 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 43, 46 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
 25. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 13, at 252 
(suggesting that because the WTO derives its power “directly from nations’ willingness to subject 
themselves” to its authority, its power may be limited). 
 26. See id. at 253 (hypothesizing an “inherent conflict” in the creation of a powerful central 
authority while simultaneously attempting to increase public participation). 
 27. Michael Jacobs, Sustainable Development as a Contested Concept, in FAIRNESS AND 
FUTURITY: ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 23 (Andrew Dobson 
ed., 1999). 
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important than the debate that is sparked by its brilliant ambiguity”—a 
debate that can more fruitfully take place in numerous fora and varying 
contexts.28 
C.  Strict Adjudicatory Interpretation of Norms Governing International 
Trade and Environmental Conflicts 
 As a third noteworthy example of grand sustainable development 
theory, consider the criticism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Appellate Body’s interpretative methodology in finding political agreement 
between nation states outside of the text of WTO instruments, regarding 
international environmental protection norms.29  John H. Knox, writing in 
the Harvard Environmental Law Review, claims that the WTO Appellate 
Body’s “ad hoc use of interpretive tools as a means to that end . . . has been 
incoherent and unpredictable.”30  In one significant respect, however, Knox 
lauds the WTO’s Appellate Body decisions in the Hormones,31 Asbestos,32 
and Shrimp Turtle I33 cases for 
 
look[ing] beyond the text before it to cite three substantive 
principles on which there is widespread agreement among WTO 
members, but for which the trade agreements themselves provide 
little or no substantive support: (a) each WTO member has the 
right to determine its own level of protection of health and safety; 
(b) natural resources are generally understood to include living 
 
 28. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 13, at 209. 
 This search for a unitary and precise meaning of sustainable development is 
misguided.  It rests on a mistaken view of the nature and function of political 
concepts.  The crucial recognition here is that, like other political terms 
(democracy, liberty, social justice, and so on), sustainable development is a 
‘contestable concept’. 
Jacobs, supra note 27, at 25 (footnotes omitted). 
 29. John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment, 
28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (“[W]hen the language [of an agreement] was unclear, the 
Appellate Body found evidence of political agreement outside [the agreement], including in 
environmental treaties and declarations.”). 
 30. Id. at 59. 
 31. WTO Appellate Body, Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.
net/reports/wtoab/ec-hormones(ab).pdf. 
 32. WTO Appellate Body, Report on European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/135ABR.doc. 
 33. WTO Appellate Body, Report on United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocu
ments/t/WT/DS/58ABR.doc. 
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natural resources; and (c) actions to protect the international 
environment should normally be based on multilateral 
agreement.34 
 
 Moreover, Knox defends the WTO Appellate Body’s “goal of finding 
extratextual political agreement in the absence of clear textual language as 
an appropriate way to compensate for the lack of a strong legislative arm in 
the WTO”35 observing that: 
 
 The Appellate Body’s resolution of trade/environment 
conflicts concerning the transboundary or global environment is 
not only clever politically.  It is also probably the optimal 
solution from an environmental point of view, since it furthers 
multilateral cooperation, the best long-term approach to 
environmental protection; at the same time it does not unduly 
restrict unilateral action, which may be the only feasible short-
term approach.36 
 
 Yet, Knox’s admiration of the pragmatic ways of the WTO Appellate 
Body stops with its interpretive methodology.37  As he explains: 
 
[The WTO Appellate Body] has used an ad hoc assortment of 
interpretive tools, including in dubio mitius, the principle of 
effectiveness, and “evolutionary” terms (as well as, occasionally, 
no clear interpretive rule at all).  These rules are not found in the 
Vienna Convention [on the Law of Treaties].  Alone, that would 
not be enough to disqualify them, since the Vienna Convention 
does not purport to codify every customary norm of 
interpretation.  Their more fundamental flaw is that none of them 
is suited to coherent, consistent application.38 
 
 34. Knox, supra note 29, at 52–53. 
 35. Id. at 59. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 62. 
 38. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  Professor Knox favors the approach of Article 
31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “When the ordinary meaning [of a trade 
agreement] is not clear and indicia of extratextual political agreement could help to support or supply a 
potential interpretation . . . .”  Id. at 65.  According to Knox: 
Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention . . . instructs the interpreter to take into 
account, together with the context of the terms of the treaty: 
 (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
 (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
 (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
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 While Knox may well be correct that the WTO’s Appellate Body 
engages in sloppy or unpersuasive reasoning on occasion, I do not wish to 
quibble with him on this point.  My main bone of contention is to disagree 
with his presupposition that international trade/environmental disputes are 
subject to simple, certain, and coherent foundational rules of interpretation.  
Notwithstanding Knox’s call for reliance on the interpretational calculus 
embedded in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, for three 
reasons it is unsophisticated and foolish to expect simplicity, certainty, and 
coherence in judicial decisions involving international trade and the 
environment battles.  First, in trying to make resolution of international 
trade/environment dispute interpretation simple, certain, and coherent, 
Knox and other interpretative foundationalists mischaracterize both the 
international web of trade and environmental laws, as well as the judicial 
enterprise.  Second, international trade law and international environmental 
law, as well as the judicial enterprise itself, are human creations and thus, 
will tend to be complex, uncertain, and occasionally inconsistent.39  Third, 
interpretation by jurists and arbitrators of international trade and 
environmental laws should be conceived of as a constantly evolving process 
of accommodation that relies upon situational intelligence to interpret the 
language and structure of international undertakings in order to carry out 
the often multiple, overlapping, and conflicting purposes of the corpus of 
international law.40 
 
 
parties. 
Id. (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(3), 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331). 
 39. This observation is inspired by a similar statement regarding the American Constitution 
and judicial interpretation.  FARBER & SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY, supra note 10, at 
ix. 
 40. See generally LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 15, at 1374–80 (summarizing the basic mood 
and craft of judicial interpretation of statutes).  Some of the more illuminating comments in this classic 
book include: “The words of a statute, taken in their context, serve both as guides in the attribution of 
general purpose and as factors limiting the particular meanings that can properly be attributed.”  Id. at 
1375; “Interpretation requires a conscious effort when the words . . . will be seen to play a double part, 
first, as a factor together with relevant elements of the context in the formulation of hypotheses about 
possible purposes, and, second, as a separately limiting factor in checking the hypotheses.”  Id.; 
“Purposes may be shaped with differing degrees of definiteness.”  Id. at 1377; “Purposes . . . may exist 
in hierarchies or constellations.”  Id.; “The purpose of a statute must always be treated as including not 
only an immediate purpose or group of related purposes but a larger and subtler purpose as to how the 
particular statute is to be fitted into the legal system as a whole.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
746                                      Vermont Law Review                       [Vol. 29:733 
 
                                                                                              
III.  TOWARD A MOOD OF GLOBAL TRADE/ECO-PRAGMATISM 
A.  Let Us Conceive of Pragmatism as More of a “Mood” Than a Theory 
 Properly understood, pragmatism is “compatible with, indeed a kind of 
continuation of, key philosophical methods and findings of Plato, Aristotle, 
and other proponents of classical natural law theory.”41  “The term 
‘pragmatism’ was introduced into the discourse of philosophers by Charles 
Sanders Peirce in 1878, to express a complex of ideas about logic (good 
thinking) which he had developed since 1867.”42  At the invitation of 
William James in 1903, Peirce gave a series of lectures at Harvard 
University with the imposing title “Pragmatism as a Principle and Method 
of Right Thinking,”43 which over the course of the next 102 years to date 
has had an enormous impact44 on philosophy in general,45 and on the 
philosophy of law in particular.46 
 We need not be obsessive about the various forms that pragmatism has 
taken since Peirce’s nineteenth-century application of the term to ideas 
about logic47 or its evolutionary modification by philosophers like Richard 
 
 41. John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 31 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (citing CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, PRAGMATISM AS A PRINCIPLE AND METHOD OF 
RIGHT THINKING: THE 1903 HARVARD LECTURES ON PRAGMATISM (Patricia Ann Turrisi ed., 1997)). 
 44. Interestingly, the etymology of this use of the word “pragmatism” antedates Peirce’s use of 
the term.  See XII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 279 (detailing the definitions of 
“pragmatism” and its historical development).  Moreover, the cognate word “pragmatic” meaning 
“relating to civil affairs” was used in English as early as 1643, and “pragmatic” was used to mean 
“[b]usy,” “interfering,” or “meddling” by Ben Johnson as early as 1616.  Id. at 277–78.  The cognate 
word “pragmatica” meaning “[a] royal ordinance having the force of a law” goes back in English usage 
to 1652.  Id. at 278.  The cognate word “pragmatical” meaning “[o]f, pertaining to, or dealing with 
practice (as opposed to theory, etc.); practical” was used in English as early as 1597.  Id.  The cognate 
word “pragmatical” meaning “[c]onceited, self-important; opinionated, dogmatic; doctrinaire, crochety” 
goes back in English usage to 1704.  Id.  See also early English usage of the following cognate words 
before deployment of “pragmatism”: “pragmatically,” “pragmaticalness,” “pragmatist,” 
“pragmatitioner,” “pragmatize,” and “pragmatizer.”  Id. at 279. 
 45. See generally CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, PEIRCE, at x (1985) (discussing Peirce’s 
philosophical views and how those topics fit together as a whole); THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
PEIRCE 1–2 (Cheryl Misak ed., 2004) (noting that one of Peirce’s philosophical contributions, the 
creation of pragmatism, created “a methodological principle for formulating [the] philosophical theories 
of truth, [and] reality”). 
 46. See Finnis, supra note 41, at 31–32 (summarizing how Peirce’s conception of pragmatism 
varies from the way legal scholars, such as Richard Posner, have conceived of pragmatism). 
 47. Finnis has thoughtfully pointed out that Charles Sanders Peirce’s seminal 1903 Harvard 
lecture talked about “abduction” as a third mode of inference (other than induction or deduction).  Id. at 
31. 
Peirce’s explains [sic] abduction as insight into data, into a mass of facts before 
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Rorty48 or legal thinkers like Richard A. Posner,49 Joseph Singer,50 and 
 
us, which we find a confused snarl, an impenetrable jungle, until it occurs to us 
that if we were to assume something to be true that we do not know to be true, 
these facts would arrange themselves luminously.  That is abduction.  The core of 
Peirce’s abduction is (we can say) what Aristotle called nous and Aquinas 
intellectus: insight, understanding that is neither deduction nor induction in the 
modern senses of that term, but is into data of experience, not a mere data-less 
intuition. 
 Peirce understands logic as properly normative, as directed and directing 
towards and by the good of truth, as the object(ive) of the human activity of 
thinking.  Every man is fully satisfied that there is such a thing as truth, or he 
would not ask any question.  That truth consists in a conformity to something 
independent of his thinking it to be so, or of any man’s opinion on that subject.  
Since logic is a human activity guided by and towards a good to be attained (the 
logical goodness of enabling attainment of the cognitive good of truth), logic is 
subordinated to (though not a mere instrument of!) another, wider knowledge of 
normativity: ethics.  And ethics, considered as norms of human action, is in turn 
based upon what Peirce (eccentrically) calls aesthetics—a knowledge of what is 
admirable per se.  Truth and knowledge of it is, therefore, one of these per se, 
intrinsic goods. 
Id. at 31–32 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
 48. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY, at xiii–xvi (1989) 
(hypothesizing that values, beliefs, and practices are contingent upon the particular time, place, and 
culture and that irony exists when people can realize this assertion and still desire and work for general 
human goals of solidarity and freedom); RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 1–3, 
12–14 (1991) (contending that objectivity is intersubjective and universal validity should be discounted 
in favor of utility for the purposes of community).  As Richard Warner has pointed out, Rorty’s 
conception of pragmatism is different from Peirce’s version: 
 Intellectual history is, in part, the history of the rejection of old norms for new 
ones, so the question inevitably arises, “What makes the prevailing norms the 
right ones?  How do we know that the assertions and actions they apparently 
justify really are justified?”  Pragmatism provides a way to answer this question: 
we can turn our norms of justification on themselves.  Of course, we cannot 
evaluate all our norms at once; some have to serve as the standard against which 
to assess the others.  The important point is that such assessment is always 
internal to the norms in question.  We assess how well our norms work by using 
those very norms.  There is no external standard of evaluation: our norms of 
justification neither have nor need a ground outside themselves.  This is the 
distinctive pragmatic claim about justification. 
 An essential point: the norms I mean are the norms we actually use day in and 
day out. . . . The focus on actually-in-use norms is a Rortyan version of 
pragmatism.  Not all pragmatists endorse this version.  Some—notably C.S. 
Pierce [sic]—allow evaluation of actual norms in light of a standard that we do 
not use, an ideal norm that we do not have but could in principle construct.  
Piercean [sic] pragmatism makes sense against the background of Pierce’s [sic] 
views about rational inquiry.  Pierce [sic] envisions different inquirers beginning 
their investigations with different and conflicting views, and he contends that, if 
all inquirers follow correct methods of rational inquiry, their views will—in the 
infinite long run—converge on a single theory.  According to Pierce [sic], this 
theory will contain what we are ideally justified in believing. 
Richard Warner, Legal Pragmatism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 385, 385–86 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (citations omitted). 
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Catherine Pierce Wells.51  Indeed, we need not be unduly concerned about 
the “one true pragmatism” or “best” pragmatic approaches to human 
problem solving exemplified by the following eloquent (but misguided) 
argument: 
 
 True pragmatism is . . . worlds removed from the 
‘pragmatism’ of those, such as Richard Rorty or Richard Posner, on 
whose lips the term signifies a . . . scepticism about truth, and a 
wilful embrace of logical incoherence and other forms of overt 
arbitrariness in assertion.  Such ‘pragmatism’, since it openly reduces 
assertion to an instrument of want-satisfaction or other drives, is no 
part of philosophy.  (Of course, just as an unjust law is part of the 
law, and bad science is part of science, so base pragmatism is part of 
philosophy!)  What needs to be said about it, for philosophical 
purposes, has been said in Plato’s analysis of base rhetoric, in the 
first of his primary discussions of natural law, the Gorgias.  True 
pragmatism, recalled albeit incompletely by Jürgen Habermas, 
understands that there is a fruitful investigation of the presuppositions 
and preconditions of the human actions (freely chosen) of thinking 
 
 49. See, e.g., POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 7, at 
227 (“I am interested in pragmatism as a disposition to ground policy judgments on facts and 
consequences rather than on conceptualisms and generalities.”); see also POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, 
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 26–28 (discussing how Odysseus in Homer’s The Odyssey embodied 
the “pragmatic mood”). 
His dominant trait is skill in coping with his environment rather than ability to 
impose himself upon it by brute force.  He is the most intelligent person in the 
Odyssey but his intelligence is thoroughly practical, adaptive.  Unlike Achilles in 
the Iliad, who is given to reflection, notably about the heroic ethic itself, 
Odysseus is pragmatic.  He is an instrumental reasoner rather than a speculative 
one. 
Id. at 27. 
 50. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 543 (1988) 
(stating that “[t]here is no single best way” to judge competing social visions and “[o]ur goal should be 
to generate competing visions of social justice” by “talk[ing] with each other about our competing 
visions of the good society”); Joseph William Singer, Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy?, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 1752, 1757 (1989) (“Truth and justice are both partly a matter of experimentation, of finding 
out what works and trying out different forms of life.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Catherine Pierce Wells, Improving One’s Situation: Some Pragmatic Reflections 
on the Art of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 323, 331–32 (1992). 
Theory and practice evolve together within a context of human purpose and 
activity; the practice informs the theory while the theory, in turn, informs the 
practice.  Thus, the hallmark of a pragmatic method is its continual reevaluation 
of practices in the light of the norms that govern them and of the norms in the 
light of the practices they generate. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [Legal] decisionmaker[s] locate the controversy within a web (or several 
different webs) of relevant normative analysis. 
Id. 
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reasonably (accurately, logically, responsibly) and discoursing 
authentically.  And among the first of those preconditions is that one 
understand, by an unmediated insight into one’s experience of 
inclination and possibility, that understanding, reasonableness, and 
knowledge are not merely possibilities but also an opportunity of 
participating in a basic human good, and thus a true reason for 
action.  The occurrence of such insights and their consolidation and 
unfolding in practical reason is a child’s reaching the age of reason.52 
 
 Contrary to the aforementioned view,53 I think that the Rortyan and 
Posnerian brand of pragmatism—because it is a loose, adaptive, and 
interactive approach to social problems in the spirit of Toulmin’s call for a 
return to practical wisdom54—is more edifying, fruitful, and more likely to 
lead to better resolutions of global trade and environment disputes than a 
foundationalist brand of pragmatism that claims to be the “one true 
pragmatism.”  Drawing upon Posner’s metaphor of Odysseus in Homer’s 
The Odyssey,55 what we need in the realm of global trade and the 
environment conflict resolution, institution building, and future evolution of 
legal norms is skill in coping with the complexities of globalization56 and 
 
 52. Finnis, supra note 41, at 32 (footnote omitted). 
 53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 54. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 55. See supra note 49. 
 56. The complexity of globalization is illustrated, first, by the “blinding pace of international 
economic activity around the planet” in recent years.  INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY, supra note 13, at 1126.  Thus: 
In 1999, world exports of goods and commercial services topped $5.5 trillion and 
$1.3 trillion, respectively.  Capital flows have also seen a spectacular increase.  
Private capital flows from developed to developing countries—including both 
foreign direct investment and speculative capital—increased five-fold from $48 
billion to $244 billion between 1990 and 1996.  This rapid growth has been driven 
in large part by international efforts to remove barriers to the flow of goods, 
services, and capital.  The growing economic interdependency among nations 
created by such liberalization has important consequences for the relationship 
between the global economy and the global environment. 
Id.  Second, the “relationship between international trade and investment, on the one hand, and the 
environment on the other” is extremely “complex and multifaceted.”  Id.  Initially, there are powerful 
arguments for continued liberalized international trade: 
 International trade has fueled much of the economic growth in the developed 
world during [the past] century, particularly following the implementation of 
global financial and trade reforms after World War II.  More recently, trade 
advocates have argued that liberalized trade (i.e., reducing trade barriers) 
promotes sustainable development. . . . [T]he arguments supporting this claim fall 
into four main categories: (1) trade liberalization enhances geopolitical stability 
by binding nations’ economies together and reducing the chance of armed 
conflict; (2) trade promotes efficient use of the world’s scarce resources and 
allows more to be produced from less; (3) trade promotes wealth maximization 
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improvement in our collective capacity to reason instrumentally and 
concretely about these complexities rather than speculatively and abstractly. 
B.  Global Trade/Eco-Pragmatism: Some Tentative Thoughts 
 In order to embrace global trade/eco-pragmatism, we need to do four 
key things: (1) recognize the importance of both international trade law and 
international environmental law; (2) applaud those ad hoc legal-political 
success stories that have both liberalized trade and created the potential for 
environmental improvement; (3) understand that the postwar trends of 
increased trade and increased concern about the environment will, at times, 
conflict and, at times, need to be coordinated better; and (4) develop a set of 
experimental working principles of a new global trade/eco-pragmatism. 
1.  Recognizing the Importance of Both Trade Law and Environmental Law 
 Global decision-makers need to acknowledge the rapid change and flux 
of both international trade law and international environmental law.  Both 
areas of law are vital to human flourishing.57 
 
and poverty alleviation through economic growth which, in turn, may eventually 
increase demand and capacity for environmental protection and clean up; and (4) 
trade enhances communication and sharing of knowledge and technologies. 
Id. at 1127; see also id. at 1127–29 (providing more detailed arguments in favor of liberalized trade); 
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., TRADE: U.S. POLICY SINCE 1945 1–59 (1984) (discussing benefits of 
free trade, in general, and specific benefits to the United States); MARK SATIN, RADICAL MIDDLE: THE 
POLITICS WE NEED NOW 144 (2004) (“The evidence shows that, on the whole, free trade improves labor 
and environmental standards.”).  However, there are also strong arguments against liberalized trade: (1) 
free trade, given the environmentally destructive nature of economic growth, will inevitably lead to 
destructive growth; (2) trade liberalization will tend to threaten domestic social preferences of individual 
nation states, like environmental protection and labor rights; (3) liberalized trade will tend to create 
pressure to lower existing environmental standards and to “chill” new environmental standards and 
organizations like the WTO “may actually strike down national environmental regulations as 
protectionist trade barriers”; (4) liberalized trade will diminish the ability of nation states to protect their 
national defense and sovereignty by creating undue reliance on external producers of armaments; and (5) 
trade liberalization will tend to create an inequitable distribution of wealth and unsustainable impacts on 
the environment.  INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 13, at 1131–34.  See 
LORI WALLACH & PATRICK WOODALL, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
THE WTO (2004), for arguments that the WTO has chilled nation states from fighting sweatshops, 
making lifesaving drugs available, protecting endangered species, providing safe meat inspection, and 
avoiding media concentration. 
 57. Cf. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 128 (1995) (discussing John 
Dewey’s 1910 writings, which argued that pragmatism required thinkers to change their attention from 
the permanent to the changing, and instead of seeking to establish universal certainties to think in terms 
of moral and political diagnosis and prognosis, as well as Joseph Bingham’s call to conceive of the law 
not as a static body of rules and principles but as a phenomenon constantly in flux from changing social 
facts). 
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2.  The “Good” Is the Enemy of the “Perfect” 
 We need to celebrate those “good,” ad hoc, legal-political success 
stories in recent years—and to do the same in future years—that have 
lowered trade barriers, opened markets, and set in motion processes and 
institutions to improve environmental quality, even if these efforts at 
international legal coping are far from “perfect.”  At least seven prominent 
candidates for such praise exist to date. 
 First, President William Jefferson Clinton’s signing of Executive Order 
13,141 in 1999, committing the U.S. government for the first time to 
conduct environmental reviews of trade agreements.58  Second, the Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) signed between the United States and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on October 24, 2000—the first U.S. trade 
agreement to include both environmental and labor obligations in the body 
of the text.59  Third, the successful negotiation and agreement between 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and its Environmental Side Agreement in the early 
1990s.60  Fourth, the encouraging progress to date of a new institution 
under the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC).61  Fifth, the impressive 
accomplishments under the 1993 U.S.–Mexico Environmental Cooperation 
Agreement (BECA) in building the capacities of two new institutions to 
work exclusively on the environmental and developmental needs of the 
border region: (1) the Border Environment Cooperation Commission 
(BECC); and (2) the North American Development Bank (NADBank).62  
 
 58. Exec. Order No. 13,141, 3 C.F.R. 235 (1999), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (2000). 
 59. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 13, at 1143–44 
(providing excerpts of the FTA).  Article 5 of the FTA provides, in part, that “each Party shall strive to 
ensure that its laws provide for high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to 
improve those laws.”  Id. at 1144. 
 60. See generally id. at 1190–252 (discussing the positive change in the trade negotiations 
process from an old method of international lawmaking to a newer, more open process that included a 
wider array of participants, which led to a new treaty regime that struck a better balance between the 
competing interests at stake). 
 61. See id. at 1227–42 (describing the inception and role of the CEC in providing a “forum for 
environmental cooperation”).  Some success stories of the CEC include CEC SECRETARIAT, FINAL 
FACTUAL RECORD FOR SUBMISSION SEM-97-001: BC ABORIGINAL FISHERIES COMMISSION ET AL. 
(May 2000); CEC SECRETARIAT, REPORT OF THE DEATH OF MIGRATORY BIRDS AT THE SILVA 
RESERVOIR (1994–1995) (1995); CEC SECRETARIAT, RIBBON OF LIFE: AN AGENDA FOR PRESERVING 
TRANSBOUNDARY MIGRATORY BIRD HABITAT ON THE UPPER SAN PEDRO RIVER (1999).  Another 
success story is the increasing sophistication of CEC’s citizen submission process.  See David L. 
Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s Citizen Submission Process, 12 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 546 (2000) (providing a history and detailed explanation of the citizen submission 
process, as well as an update on its “current status”). 
 62. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 13, at 1245–47 
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Sixth, the interesting approach that has evolved in the European Union 
(EU): providing guidance to prospective members to redesign and 
strengthen their national environmental laws before they are eligible to join 
the EU so that their laws “approximate” EU environmental laws.63  And, a 
seventh good, ad hoc, legal-political success story in melding international 
trade and international environmental concerns—despite persistent 
setbacks—is the impressive recent accomplishments of the WTO’s 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE).64 
3.  What Is Past Is Prologue 
 We need to understand that “[t]he growth of policy linkages between 
the formerly distinct policy areas of trade and environmental regulation is 
related to the convergence of two critical postwar trends: an increase in the 
volume of world trade and an increase in the amount and scope of 
environmental regulation”65—two positive developments for the world’s 
 
(detailing BECC’s role in certifying environmental infrastructure projects along the border and securing 
financing from the NADBank). 
 63. Ritt Bjerregaard, Preface to COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GUIDE TO THE 
APPROXIMATION OF EUROPEAN UNION ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION 3 (2d ed. 1998), available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/guide/guidfin.pdf. 
 64. See David Vogel, International Trade and Environmental Regulation, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 371, 380–81 (Norman J. Vig & Michael 
E. Kraft eds., 5th ed. 2003). 
 The CTE [to date] has been unable to address any of the critical substantive 
issues surrounding the impact of WTO rules on environmental regulations.  Part 
of the reason for this standstill is the inability of the EU and the United States to 
agree on how specifically the WTO should be made greener. . . . But a far more 
important reason is the sharp divisions between developed and developing 
nations. . . . In this context, it is worth recalling that three of the most 
controversial trade-environment disputes to come before the GATT/WTO—
namely, the tuna-dolphin, reformulated gasoline, and shrimp-turtle disputes—
pitted less developed countries against a coalition of U.S. environmentalists and 
domestic producers. 
 Nonetheless the [WTO’s] CTE has had some accomplishments.  It has increased 
the visibility of environmental issues within the WTO bureaucracy as revealed, 
for example, by the steady stream of reports on the impact of trade liberalization 
on environmental protection that have flowed from the organization’s 
headquarters in Geneva since the mid-1990s.  It has also promoted increased 
coordination between the WTO and the secretariats of international environmental 
meetings and treaties.  Finally, it has helped provide states with more information 
about each other’s domestic regulations that affect trade. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the CTE, see Gregory C. Shaffer, 
The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s 
Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 74–81 (2001). 
 65. Vogel, supra note 64, at 371 (footnote omitted). 
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people, but two developments that cry out for coordination, systematization, 
and reconciliation. 
4.  Toward Global Trade-Eco-Pragmatism 
 Building on the incisive insights of Daniel A. Farber and other 
observers, we need to focus our attention more on solving particular trade 
and environmental conundrums in a pragmatic fashion that builds legal 
principles up from concrete facts of particular cases, rather than down from 
abstract, centralizing, foundational grand theories.66  Some key points of a 
new global trade/eco-pragmatism might include the following: 
 
 a.  “[H]ard policy issues will [not] magically become simple.”67  
Indeed, “there is no escape from the need to wrestle seriously with the 
particulars of a given problem.”68  There are, alas, no ready answers to hard 
problems like reconciling the economic aspirations of developing countries 
and the global environmental aspirations of developed countries.  Of 
dealing with global warming.  Of preserving global biodiversity. 
 
 b.  Policymakers should attempt to use multiple environmental 
baselines in trying to come to grips with global, trans-boundary, and in-state 
pollution and environmental degradation “tempered by the use of cost-
benefit analysis as a test of reasonableness.”69 
 
 c.  In interpreting MEAs, bilateral environmental agreements, global 
trade treaties, regional free trade agreements, bilateral free trade 
agreements, and the like, I suggest that courts and arbitrators try to grapple 
with combining and reconciling both a “green” canon of interpretation 
(“construing ambiguous [treaties] in favor of as much environmental 
protection as is reasonably feasible”)70 and a “blue” canon of interpretation 
(inspired by the open blue, borderless planet floating in space—construing 
ambiguous treaties in favor of as much liberalized and free trade as is 
reasonably feasible). 
 
 
 66. See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 11 (1999) (“Rather than rigid rules or mechanical techniques, we 
need a framework that leaves us open to the unique attributes of each case, without losing track of our 
more general normative commitments.”). 
 67. Id. at 11. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 12. 
754                                      Vermont Law Review                       [Vol. 29:733 
 
                                                                                              
 d.  In fashioning future international legal agreements, and in 
implementing new ones, we should strive for legal empowerment of 
international institutions to be environmentally protective but maximally 
flexible so that when we learn that an international environmental 
regulatory scheme is outmoded, the relevant international regulatory 
institutions can take fresh, effective approaches that follow deregulatory 
paths.71 
 
 e.  In groping to find appropriate international institutions to achieve 
expanded and liberalized trade that is environmentally appropriate, we 
should imaginatively open ourselves to the possibilities of both 
governmental and quasi-governmental institutions playing roles—as well as 
private-public partnerships.  In this regard, as one commentator aptly 
remarked in describing the outcome of the 2002 Johannesburg, South 
Africa World Summit on Sustainable Development: 
 
[T]his Summit will be remembered not for the treaties, the 
commitments, or the declarations it produced, but for the first 
stirrings of a new way of governing the global commons—the 
beginnings of a shift from the stiff formal waltz of traditional 
diplomacy to the jazzier dance of improvisational solution-
oriented partnerships that may include non-government 
organizations, willing governments and other stakeholders.72 
 
 f.  Finally, as part of our first steps toward global trade/eco-
pragmatism, we should seek to better document the positive and negative 
environmental consequences of particular liberalized trade measures, as 
well as any positive or negative economic consequences of these measures.  
This information should be freely and easily available on the Internet. 
CONCLUSION 
 Sustainable development grand theory—illustrated by three prominent 
examples of a proposed overarching international environmental law 
covenant, an idealized and centralized global sustainable development 
agency, and strict adjudicatory canons for interpreting international 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Charlotte Streck, The World Summit on Sustainable Development: Partnerships as New 
Tools in Environmental Governance, in 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 
supra note 24, at 63, 65 (quoting Press Release, World Resources Institute, WRI Expresses 
Disappointment Over Many WSSD Outcomes (Sept. 4, 2002), available at http://newsroom.wri.org/new
srelease_text.cfm?NewsReleaseID=135). 
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trade/environmental treaties—is misguided.  Rather than sustainable 
development grand theory, a more sensible and workable approach—what I 
call global trade/eco-pragmatism—would eschew the top-down, unified, 
foundational tendencies of grand theory in favor of bottom-up, fact-
intensive, intelligent problem solving. 
 Global trade/eco-pragmatism recognizes that treaties dealing with trade 
and the environment, as well as interpretation and implementation of these 
treaties, are human creations; therefore, results will be complex, uncertain, 
and sometimes inconsistent.  Liberalization of international trade and 
protection of the global environment both involve a constantly evolving, 
difficult process of accommodation and cannot be managed by artificial 
grand theories built from abstract principles from on high. 
